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Introduction
Writing philosophically about the purposes and values of higher education is a 
delicate process and problematic to boot. No amount of admiration can conceal the 
present funding concerns of higher education institutions. Some facts of the matter 
require acknowledgment, though more in the interests of common sense than peace of 
mind. Throughout the developed world higher education funding is under increasing 
scrutiny. Administrations have responded by examining models of reform and 
transformation to preserve their institutions. These models are giving rise to a ‘change 
agenda’ promoting greater efficiency (reform) and novel configurations of disciplines 
(transform). Changes across the sector are deconstructing ancient academic divisions. 
There is uncertainty about what will be different in the aftermath of change. Merely 
arguing against change, in the expectation that it will be convincingly deflected, is a 
Sisyphean task. The range of interests with attachments to the sector makes pursuing 
such arguments a tantalizing undertaking. Presumably, a subset of the interest groups, 
de facto  a power elite, would prefer any debate to remain superficial. This concern is 
an irrelevancy philosophically speaking. The business of philosophical analysis is not 
propaganda.
The assumptions grounding change are philosophically pertinent as any analysis must 
be pinned to discernible objects. Opinions supporting reform and transformation 
frequently present themselves as Hobson’s choice—change or wither away. The 
warrant of these positions contains an assortment of assumptions. Many of these are 
quite knotty, drawn from a forest o f economic, educational, political, social and 
technological sources. While it is not possible, in this paper, to address all points of 
interest, a number of reviews of contemporary institutions have identified and 
recommended principles of change. These are usually presented as normative 
principles for the sector. Their assumptions are of interest here. The proponents of 
change frequently use interchangeably the terms ‘change’, ‘diversify’, ‘expand’, 
‘reform’, and ‘transform’. This creates a semantic muddle. Even a cursory lexical 
analysis reveals that the terms are certainly not synonymous, and far from 
interchangeable in ordinary discourse. An institution may reform some of its practices 
in the interests of justice or efficiency. Few higher education institutions reform, 
however, to cast off a dissolute or immoral lifestyle. Transformation implies a clearly 
identifiable change in the form and nature o f an object, but presumably the proponents 
of change shy away from recommending neutron bombardment of campuses as a 
means for transforming work practices. In what follows, transformation is implicitly 
understood as a radical process of alteration, more akin to metamorphosis. The entity 
is different in kind after the process, not simply reformed in efficiency. 
Diversification and expansion could be related through the creation of a wider variety 
of activities within an institution and it is reasonable to accept this as a mode of 
development. Despite the seeming neutrality of change, it implies a modification to 
the state of an object, including its replacement by another object with similar if not 
superior properties. Subsuming talk of institutional reforms and transformations under
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the general rubric o f change seems linguistically reasonable, and it is the approach 
adopted here on occasion.
Before outlining contemporary challenges and several responses, a brief overview of 
historical models o f institutional development within higher education is offered. 
Solutions to the perceived current funding ‘crisis’ emphasise radical institutional 
change. An increased role for technology in education is recommended largely 
uncritically (possibly best understood as the technocratisation of education). One 
corollary o f this principle is the attempted commoditisation o f knowledge— based on 
the assumption that learning and knowledge can be moulded appropriately to 
technology. These two processes are considered and their implications for the 
cultivation of a culture of learning are teased out. The paper concludes with a 
discussion about the future of knowledge and virtue in the universities.
Yesterday’s Forecasts about Higher Education
The space occupied by higher education is filled by various categories of institution 
offering a plethora of post-compulsory secondary education accreditations. Due to 
historical serendipity, universities have dominated and defined the criteria for 
assessing membership and performance within the sector, i.e. they have been m 
existence longer than the other types of institution. Universities are the gatekeepers of 
higher education. This primus inter pares role is important to bear in mind when 
considering any likely ripple effect arising from their reform and transformation. This 
is not to denigrate other tertiary-level institutions. It just acknowledges that the 
models of accreditation, teaching and research adopted in the universities have been 
propagated throughout most of the global higher education sector. Over the past eight 
centuries, the medieval universitas, with its community of masters and scholars, has 
evolved into a template for the whole higher education sector. Changes that occur 
within the university system will, based on custom and precedent, produce changes 
within the university family and other areas of higher education.
Any scan of the history of university development reveals that close family 
resemblances are highly prized. Humboldt’s model of the research university, for 
example, quickly influenced American university planning in the nineteenth century.1 
The iconic cloistered environments of Oxford and Cambridge, over the centuries, 
have influenced thinking about the ideal university of scholars with special regard for 
the Humanities.2 One exegesis of the latter is found in Newman’s idea of a university 
as a place for allowing the exploration of contemplative knowledge, specifically 
Christian in outlook.3 Newman in his own cast of the university valued contemplative 
scholarship so highly that he considered the pursuit of practical knowledge 
incompatible with the pursuit of an ‘intellectual culture that is its own end’. His 
university scheme was unsympathetic to Humboldt’s model. It rejected the principle 
that education should be honed to commercial needs, and was hostile to the 
instrumentalist principle that knowledge was a means to an end. The targets of 
Newman’s disdain were primarily (a) Locke’s belief that Liberal Education was an 
exercise in stuffing children’s heads ‘with a deal of trash’ and (b) Francis Bacon’s 
insistence that knowledge should benefit the wider community, not merely the 
scholar.4 Both the latter thinkers, living at the cusp of the transition between the old 
Aristotelian scholasticism and the emerging Enlightenment in astronomy, 
mathematics and science, reasoned that knowledge should be acquired to assist 
mankind. Education should have a utility value beyond the self-edification of the
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scholar. Bacon’s reasoning has a marked technological bias. The purpose of the 
scholar’s investigations is to turn up knowledge that has application in the world.5 
Newman’s aspiration that a contemplative scholarly community would promote the 
required intellectual virtues for the good of all was influenced by medieval neo- 
Aristotelian thought. His university was explicitly religious in complexion. The 
‘scientific inquirer’ for ‘fear of giving scandal’ would be required to avoid 
precipitously disseminating any ‘speculations* that might be in conflict with 
ecclesiastical authority.6 Notionally the sciences could define their own sphere of 
inquiry, but in actuality the need to avoid encounters with ecclesiastical authority 
would be a constraint on inquiry. It is not our purpose here to critique Newman’s 
ideas in depth, but it is worth noting that the distinguished philosopher and polymath, 
Bertrand Russell, contended somewhat polemically that, historically, progress in 
science had been achieved in the teeth of opposition from Aristotle’s disciples.7 The 
persecution of Galileo by the Inquisition for his breach of the doctrines of scholastic 
Aristotelian cosmology is but one example. Indeed religious universities’ defence of 
their dogma continues to this day.8
As fate would have it, even as Newman committed his model to paper, it was largely 
still-bom in most industrial democracies. German and American universities were 
engaged in exploiting their research output and producing unprecedented numbers of 
industrial scientists. The American pragmatist philosopher, John Dewey, argued that 
an elitist model of university education would not meet the needs of America’s 
democracy. Meeting the needs of society included meeting the needs of industry. 
Dewey, a committed Darwinist, believed that scientific knowledge should be invited 
into all areas of people’s lives, not just to improve their intellectual culture, but to 
increase prosperity. Education had to serve democracy, industrialisation and the 
spread of science.9 Towards the end of the nineteenth century, by coincidence, 
Harvard had became one of the first modem universities organised around 
professional schools with graduate education targeted at specific sectors of the 
economy—a model rapidly disseminated across the continent.1
Both Humboldt’s and Newman’s models of the university have many commendable 
features. Both were conditioned by the prevailing cultural, economic and political 
conditions of their time. Humboldt’s model was primarily secular and scientific. Most 
importantly, it established that a core activity of a university was research. This 
legacy was to have lasting importance and arguably was Humboldt’s finest 
contribution to higher education theory. However, a Classical backwash was still 
present. The principle of Lehrfreiheit (a professor’s freedom to teach) and Lernjreiheit 
(a student’s freedom to leam) only partially suited the industrial expansion of 
Germany at that time. Germany was experiencing a resurgent nationalism. Education 
was a path to cultural regeneration and prosperity. To provide practical courses— 
Realen—for enterprise and industry, German states, following French example, set up 
the Technische Hochschulen. These also had to provide chairs in either philosophy or 
history. As German university ‘pure research’ began to produce results (especially in 
organic chemistry) with industrial value, the battle between the pure studies in 
sciences (the Wissenschaften, including philosophy) and practical studies began to 
subside.11
Tensions between the sciences and the humanities were resolvable in Germany 
because both were accepted as making significant contributions to the re-emergence
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of the nation,12 Economic success ensured that the balance remained tilted in favour 
of the sciences. Due to its success, the Humboldtian model could be perceived as an 
academic paragon. A recent critique o f the academic and political ideology o f the 
Humboldtian model, nevertheless, argues that it pursued ‘truth* and ‘truth seeking’ at 
the expense of social and political responsibility.13 The German university system 
became divorced from the greater political and social life of the state and avoided 
critiques of political ideologies which may, had they been effective, have averted 
some o f the worst human catastrophes o f the past century. The argument is moot, but 
it raises several thorny moral issues for consideration.
In contrast to the German system, Newman’s model was decidedly ecclesiastical and 
Humanities focused.14 Any commonality lay in the role of philosophy (and inter alia 
history) to guide the sciences.15 Newman’s model permitted science, but it was fenced  
o ff  from industry. Even if  in principle the religious bias in his model was removable, 
what remains is the quintessential cloistered community of scholars. The transmission 
of knowledge for the prosperity o f society is an indeterminate end. Yet, Newman’s 
valuing of education for its own sake is still revered in higher education pedagogy. He 
rejected education for profit and defended liberal knowledge against ‘technical skill’ 
education. Contemporary institutions echo similar tensions between the worth of 
liberal knowledge relative to science and technical education, and the worth of both 
relative to the governmental expectations of higher education.16 Nowadays, 
universities contain different proportions o f both models, depending on country, 
culture and economy. The blended model has served the Anglophone and European 
higher education sectors well (as measured by their prosperity among OECD 
countries) but within the past two decades the blended model has come under pressure 
from a variety of sources. Why it is under pressure to change and what forces are 
arrayed in favour o f change are for consideration next.
Welfare Ideology, Radical Transformation and Academic Capitalism
University reform has always attracted its share of opponents and proponents. There 
is nothing new in the Humanities and Sciences hectoring one another.17 Tensions 
between tradition and change within the sector have deep historical roots.18 In the 
past, the problems posed by these disputes were largely internal to the universities 
themselves and resolvable within available resources—for example, mass access 
issues did not influence the outcome o f debate.
The scales on which the universities operated and their intersection with society were 
slimmer than experienced today. Since the end of the Second World War, the 
interface that a university has with the economy and society is complex, multifaceted 
and dominated by accountability anxieties. Subject areas have broadened immensely. 
Student populations are drawn from a wider variety of socio-economic and cultural 
backgrounds. The increase in commerce, law and media courses have created greater 
awareness of what universities ‘do’, and created expectations o f what they ‘could do’ 
and ‘should do’.19 The escalation in diversity of interests and outputs, which is largely 
less than two generations old, has stimulated and strained established models. So 
many different communities o f scholars with such a wide array of interests, economic 
contact points and output objectives inhabit a campus that the term ‘multiversity’ is 
probably a more fitting rubric for the site of their activities20 The problem of keeping 
the multiversity fuelled with resources, both human and technical, is at the heart of the 
current university reform debate.
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Once mention of wider economic and social priorities enters into discussions about 
the sustainability of the universities, problematic questions about relevance and value 
for money surface. Economic globalisation, greater ease o f access to higher education, 
volatile student demographics and dwindling state funding are creating strains within 
the university sector. The transfer of autonomy to universities, favoured throughout 
the OECD regions, has proven to be a poisoned chalice. The universities ‘receive’ 
autonomy, but the price has been a reduction in state sponsorship. Higher education in 
general has been subject to a shift away from the post-war state welfare network 
(interpreted broadly) and into what might be called a ‘market-place’. Criticisms of the 
welfare state have focused on its ‘wastage’ of resources and its alleged 
unaccountability. The state’s about-turn on university funding is partly due to ‘the 
state having lost legitimacy as a result of the fiscal crisis... [the state] is trying to 
renovate that legitimacy by repudiating the public service and shaking hands with the 
invisible hand of the market’.21 The ‘crisis’ facing the universities is how to define 
their missions and goals in a manner compatible with the state’s altered view of the 
university as a tool for pre-competitive, techno-scientific research.
Presently, the fundamental issue for consideration should not be whether universities 
change, reform or transform. Sheep do not continue to graze bare hills but move on to 
new ones. The requirement for reflective adjustment to the prevailing culture and 
political environment is essential to the survival of any institution. The anxiety is less 
about transformation in principle, but more about the sufficiency o f any proposed 
transformation. Re-organisational problems facing the universities arise only in a 
minor way from an internal resistance to change, as demonstrated by numerous 
historical examples of reform. The problems left to confront are largely due to the 
universities’ own failures to promote internal processes of change. For decades the 
institutions have been satisfied with internal feudal power relations. Now when 
change comes, it comes from outside. The dynamic for reform has been taken out of 
the hands of the sector by the state. Many in authority, in response, profess a growing 
interest in, and support for, sweeping changes to traditional norms, practices and 
rules.22
Legitimation of the changed university is dependent upon the eradication of elitist 
practices in scholarship and inquiry, or so the argument runs. Nothing short of a 
process of radical transformation of the universities is sufficient.23 The assumption is 
arguably not based on logical reasoning or scientific investigation, but on persuasive 
comparisons between international institutions, government policies, and 
demographic trends glued together by a business process re-engineering commentary. 
This new ideology o f  transformation (a ‘change ideology’) relies on a theory of 
corporatism for sustaining the universities in the future. Essentially, the universities 
must adopt business models and learn to market their activities for profit. By way of 
illustration, higher education institutions will be expected to ‘generate financial 
surpluses’ and ‘market themselves more energetically internationally’,24 The 
universities combine their interests with other economic, social, industrial and 
professional groups to form enterprises. The corporate goals and influences of these 
latter groups are then fused to greater or lesser degrees with those of the state. 
Corporatism is particularly attractive to economies where hierarchical structures 
dominate the development of economic policies and the organization of industry, 
labour and professional groupings. In order for it to be effective, corporatism requires 
a subscription to a neo-feudal organisational philosophy. In its practical
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manifestations it replaces consent, sought from larger populations, with consultation 
processes among hierarchies.25 Despite a history plagued by despots ranging from 
Mussolini to Peron, corporatism is fundamentally a mixed economy ideology (in 
conventional political parlance, a Third Way). Superficially, it is a compromise 
between private capital and state subsidy interests which avoids the ‘wastage’ of 
welfarism. In this way, it beneficially raises the legitimacy of both state and 
universities. Many recommendations for change within the university sector are 
consistent with corporatism, if  not indeed motivated by it. National wage agreements 
involving social partnership arrangements are relatively common examples of 
corporatism in smaller EU states,26
Inter-institutional and transnational comparisons have influenced the change agenda 
and determined the putative conditions for ‘entrepreneurial’ universities.27 These 
inductive exercises rely on relatively small sample sizes. Conditions for one fortunate 
‘entrepreneurial’ outcome may be difficult if  not impossible to replicate in other 
settings. The generalisability of the results is debatable. For example, if  corporation X 
sponsors work at University Y to the value o f N million Euros, it is improbable that 
the same corporation will offer similar sponsorship to other universities on a scale 
sufficient to make a difference to their revenues.
These exercises result in general principles being divided between admonitions, 
exhortations and vagueness. For example, in Burton Clark’s work, the general 
principles of university innovation (‘entrepreneurship’) involve a ‘shift in 
organisational character’ leading to a ‘more promising posture’ and the development 
of a “‘stand up” university’ where ‘institutional entrepreneurship can be seen both as 
a process and an outcome’. These insights are in turn collected into ‘five 
transformation pathways’, the guiding principles for change. The first pathway 
recommends ‘strengthening the steering core’ of individuals that have chosen to lead 
the transformation. This core must embrace central management groups in order to 
reconcile ‘new’ managerial values with traditional academic ones. The second 
pathway recommends an ‘expanded developmental periphery’ to enhance the 
university’s trade with the external world. The periphery would be populated by 
research centres. The third pathway calls for a diversified financial base through 
closer corporate cooperation, increased service provision and student attraction. The 
idea of a ‘stimulated academic heartland’, the fourth pathway, is conditioned by the 
‘need’ to add value to the university’s mission. It should feed into the final pathway, 
and support ‘an integrated entrepreneurial culture’. While superficially comforting, 
the problem with vague general principles is that they are too easily subject to 
counterexample and can suffer fatally from a multitude o f qualifications.2
The avowed atm is to boost the capacity of the university by identifying and 
supporting activities that build resources and improve infrastructure while at the same 
time rewarding entrepreneurial excellence. Detailing these mappings is a seminal 
transformative step for the entrepreneurial university. Inevitably this entails looking 
for the best corporate fit between the university and industry, with government being 
called upon occasionally to aid match-making.29 While most of the initiatives 
recognise that transformations are not facile undertakings, few question the 
assumption that they will succeed.30 Despite the generalities of many of the 
recommendations put forward, the rise o f ‘academic capitalism’ is inexorably forcing 
universities into market-place thinking and planning. Irrespective of whether one
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wholly or partially rejects the entrepreneurial drive, traditional academic work 
practices are being impinged upon by external factors largely, but not entirely, outside 
one’s control.31 The impact of these changes on scholarship and research is 
commented upon in official reviews only in so far as they can be shoehomed into 
appropriate service sector categories, i.e. saleable products and services. A striking 
feature of the change theorising is how little is said about the relationship between 
knowledge and understanding—an oversight with troubling connotations.
Modem universities have become places of greater apprehension than was imaginable 
a generation ago. The purpose and role of university education is more explicitly fixed 
to economic utility than has been witnessed before. Anxiety is experienced more 
keenly in the Humanities than elsewhere, due to state policies favouring technology 
and the dominance of product relevance in discourse about university values. One 
noted critic argued that philosophy’s failure to ‘take command of the crisis in the 
universities’ has placed many traditional disciplines within liberal education in line 
for extinction.32 Within this arena, the ‘democratisation’ and ‘popularisation’ of 
higher education, both of which are at the top of the change agenda, maintain their 
detractors and supporters. Not everyone accepts that the introduction of the ‘trash of 
popular culture’ has undermined academic regard for freedom and the cultivation o f 
reason.33 Likewise, there are good arguments for maintaining the ‘old’ academic 
allegiance to the idea o f a university as the producer o f rational and compassionate 
‘world citizens’.34 These debates, contested vigorously by all parties, demonstrate the 
vitality of reasoned disputation within the university environment. They are also at 
odds with all the jargon of the market-place and product relevance, and because of 
their perspectives on the value of higher education, they pose the greatest adjustment 
challenge to the university as a community of scholars. On reflection, and 
unsurprisingly, the primary agitators are not organically linked to higher education. 
They are external to the sector. Their persuasion is articulated differently through the 
power of their economic influence over the continuing existence of the universities. 
Here the debate is not whether Plato should be pursued or feminist theories of 
literature facilitated. Rather it is about whether there should be institutions at all 
willing to support any shade o f inquiry that is not in strict conformity with the macro- 
economic agenda of the state.
Throughout the OECD countries, universities are often cited as the source of their 
own misfortune. In Ireland, for example, a recent report presses that ‘reform and 
modernization of the university’ is in the interest of national economic development.35 
The report recommends that the university sector monitor the ‘relevance of its 
products’. Another review questions whether the university ‘has a future’ unless it 
embraces the ‘opportunity’ afforded by ‘the American corporate university 
movement’.36 Universities are no longer to prioritise contemplative higher learning, or 
contributions to society’s cultural life. They are charged with subtending the 
economic development of the nation. Not only is there a moral duty on them to accept 
this role, but there is also an imposed economic onus.
The Liberal Arts are vulnerable to extinction in this climate, as they become 
‘uneconomic’ to maintain. Many universities with traditional liberal education 
curricula have explored the marketing of their Humanities offerings as a result.37 
These universities are ‘brand’ conscious and aware of ‘customer’ (student) 
requirements. Academic departments operate as ‘business units’ and ‘revenue
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centres’. Courses become ‘marketable products’ whose relevance must be kept 
current. Does this imply that a price can be put on everything within a university? Or 
to put it another way, what are the implications for those disciplines that do not fit 
within a university’s pricing policy? Any answer is bound to be contentious, but in the 
absence of other sources of external funding, what is those disciplines’ future?
A less deferential analysis of campus commercialisation—which includes everything 
from track athletics to medical research—concludes that the for-profit campus risks 
compromising its objectivity in the eyes of the public.38 If the public perceives the 
universities as too enthralled to corporate sponsorship, legitimate academic work 
could be devalued. One could argue therefore that contrary to transformative 
assumptions, the more legitimation is sought through the market-place, the less value 
attaches to it. Human health research, for example, must reach the highest ethical and 
scientific standards to sustain public confidence. The ethical implications of ever- 
increasing corporate sponsorship of medical and pharmacological research are 
particularly disquieting. The possibility that researchers are tempted to skew results 
favourably towards their sponsors is not at all fantastical.3 The neutrality of 
university research and teaching is the university’s finest and most respected quality. 
This quality lends the university moral authority, social standing and scientific 
respect. Any major subversion of this value, arising from commercial pressures, 
would irreparably damage the whole sector. In a similar vein, the tailoring of 
educational programmes to match corporate needs, and the reduction in academic 
standards to support greater mass access, are debated as regrettable developments due 
to their impact on pedagogy and scholarship. One effect of mass intake policies has 
been a greater shift in emphasis on to the graduate school and its commercialisation.
Martha Nussbaum uses different lenses to study the value of traditional humanities 
learning.40 She argues that traditional liberal education curricula can be reformed to 
accommodate ‘diversity thinking’ and produce ‘world citizens’ with critical thinking 
skills. Rooted deep in respect for Socratic reasoning, Nussbaum articulates the idea 
that higher learning is inseparably both a moral and rational exercise. The rational 
agent is also influenced by empathy. Critical rational education is not an exercise in 
drilling students in conformity, but provides a sound basis for both inquiry and moral 
reasoning. The aspiration that a university’s finest end is the production of better 
citizens is an unbroken thread through the entire history of higher education. Yet, it 
barely receives acknowledgement in current higher education reviews where 
emphasis is placed on serving the economy first and foremost. In the transformation 
literature, learning is reduced to ‘specialisation’ and ‘mastery of the content of 
modularised courses’ 41 This is unsurprising in a climate where student needs are not 
led by the requirements of higher learning, but higher learning is led by them, viz. the 
need to cater for the ' graduate labour market’.
Nussbaum’s views on the moral relevance of higher education also resonate with 
recent comment on the ‘social relevance’ of the universities.42 The main concern in 
Breton and Lambert’s commentary is whether the universities as a whole can develop 
a ‘global logic’ to account for their relevance. The yardstick for assessing the 
contributions of universities will be the role they assign themselves in developing 
international civil society. Measuring their future relevance will be based on how 
they help overcome socio-economic divisions between North and South. 
Comparatively speaking, Nussbaum’s measure of higher education relevance can be
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understood as primarily micro-focused at the level of citizenship, while Breton and 
Lambert’s measure is rooted in success with macro- and global societal problems. 
Both measures are compatible and unmistakably interdependent. The logical primacy 
is with Nussbaum’s production of world citizens, however, and this is the nub of the 
problem. In practice, the ‘world citizen’ is an ideal to measure everyday performance 
against. The extent to which modem higher education attains traditional university 
goals of rational and moral development, or even should aspire to them is, and has 
been, a divisive issue for some time. As an aspiration it may become entirely 
unrealistic, since nonconformity around ‘product relevance’ is almost certainly 
anathema to the ideological goals of change.
The proposition that corporatism (Clark’s entrepreneurial university) is 
remanufacturing the universities as factories to produce knowledge using pseudo- 
industrial planning policies has led to concerns about the type o f thinking fostered in 
higher education.3 In this analysis, the universities’ proximity to, and respect for, 
corporate thinking (and funding) has ensured that no forms of critical thinking are 
presented to students that might jar with corporate ideology. Higher learning in the 
universities is being ‘dismantled’ by promoting an ideology o f corporate conformism. 
Questions about the internal dynamics of corporate thinking (in terms of 
organisational efficiency and performance) are permitted, but more fundamental 
questions about ethical and philosophical effects are, by consensus, off the learning 
agenda. Based on cross-institutionaJ comparisons, another analysis makes a 
supporting case that the development o f ‘academic capitalism’ is pushing universities 
in a direction leading to conformity in thinking and research agendas.44 The rewards 
for conformity outweigh possible career risks associated with nonconformity. 
Whatever connection there is between relevance and truth discovery is even more 
difficult to unpack in these cases. Provided it attracts funding, dressing up research in 
a thin veil o f ‘truth-seeking’ may ensure that almost any ideological and scientific 
bias will pass muster. The focus is on the funds attracted, not the work itself. Research 
nonconformity is a challenge to this corporate reward policy. Nonconformity as a 
challenge to transformational thinking is at least awkward, and at worst heretical. It is 
awkward when a ‘commitment to reason’ does not allow a policy to move forward 
because of its demonstrated incoherence, and heretical when it seeks to subvert 
change by demonstrating contradictions in the logic of reform and transformation.
The Doctrine of Change and Changing Teaching
> Being doctrinaire—ideologically sound—on the necessity for change has assumed 
critical political importance for organisations promoting change. Trivial changes are 
indeed unlikely to unseat traditional scholarly ideals, but that determination is a 
function of the scale of any proposed changes. It rests also on the naive assumption 
that value neutrality is restricted to the identification of trivia. What one sector in the 
university system considers a trivial reform may not be seen as such by others. 
Deliberative scholarly assemblies do not effect rapid alterations—but it is not their 
mission, and never has been, to rapidly alter their configuration.
The primary theatre of change is not a set of minor adjustments to the organisational 
mechanics of the university. Change promotion at a system-wide level implies a 
significant alteration to the means by which the universities meet their purposes. This 
influences a redefinition of these same purposes. The philosophical task is to assess 
whether inquiry and learning are being subverted rather than enhanced by the
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attendant change agendas. If  reformation and transformation are necessary, then what 
are the least destructive changes required? Facing up to this question compels one to 
acknowledge that the change ideology has marshalled elite forces in its favour. These 
range from state organs through to multinational companies. Appraising rational 
counterarguments against it seems practically futile, and theoretically vacuous. The 
state-sponsored nature o f the commissioning process o f many reviews o f higher 
education, irrespective of country, ensures that their recommendations are raised to 
the status of political doctrine. A defining characteristic of contemporary reviews is 
their emphasis on transformation. The insistence that transformation will produce a 
marvellous good is so pervasive that it almost defies rational counterblows. This is 
one o f the pinching strengths of ideologies spawned by corporatism. The widespread 
dissemination and endorsement of the view among elites erodes the political grounds 
for challenge. Yet, much of the reasoning in support of ‘change’ is based on polar 
interpretations of activities within the universities. ‘Good’ activities are those that 
attract funding. ‘Bad’ activities are those that fail to attract funding. The 
transformation imperative is that universities must act as market-driven organisations, 
constantly alert to novel opportunities to attract ‘new’ students. Mechanisms must be 
found to implement this thinking. Not all of these mechanisms have laudable moral 
ends, however. Coupling the relief of financial pressure with an increased emphasis 
on attracting international students to universities may have little to do with fostering 
multi-cultural understanding.
Moral implications flow from the implementation of change, but these are overlooked 
in the welter of approving books, commentaries and reports. Subservience to fiscal 
targets is the governing modality for ‘correctly’ approaching the debate. 
Unfortunately, there is an absence o f society-wide debate at this level of detail. There 
are reasons for this lacuna. In the global economy, the connection between economic 
performance and knowledge is presented as a master-slave, subordination 
relationship. The persuasion applied to the universities to develop a culture of product 
relevance has implications for many other human activities. Society may be rapidly 
moving to a phase when knowledge that lacks commercial potential may become non- 
categorisable as knowledge per se. Partly, this is explained by the dominant ideology 
of corporatism within which the human element is mere input, raw material for 
immersion in organisational processes which exist to service industrial activities. Lost 
in these processes are the social and personal realities of human lives. A deeply 
troubling quality of all the transformational studies is the thin role allowed for human 
expression and creativity outside the servicing of university-corporate partnerships. 
This is hardly consonant with the promotion of traditional virtues such as altruism, 
respect for others and tolerance,
The status of teaching in this culture of change is equally problematical. An alluring 
attraction o f ‘change reasoning’ and ‘radical transformation’ is that they conveniently 
decouple teaching from the evaluation of an institution’s worth, let alone an 
individual’s. The physical location of learning environments is seen as an obstacle to 
change because geographical fixity is not compatible with ideological principles that 
group knowledge with other saleable commodities. Teaching by itself alone cannot 
attract revenue, and what cannot attract revenue is suspect. In the solution scenario, 
radical transformation, teaching is reduced to a component in a Knowledge 
Management (KM) system. This re-organisation of teaching has the economic side- 
effect of providing a niche for technology to assist with managing the teaching
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component. Wherever teaching is undertaken, technology can render it accessible to 
the masses. This process will be handled by Knowledge Transfer (KT) mechanisms. 
KM will make sure that the knowledge is collated, stored and accessible, and KT will 
make sure to transmit it efficiently to the customer in whatever medium is deemed 
progressive—and marketable. At least, this is the theory. Teaching is made amenable 
to a marketing agenda using the new media technologies. In turn this ensures ‘closer 
cooperation’ with corporate values. Institutionalised deference to market forces then 
makes it possible to deliver teaching (presumed to be ‘knowledge’) to the masses 
without anyone ever having to move beyond their living rooms.
While notionally this idea is pursued in the name of widening access to education, a 
value intrinsic to the university ideal, there are at least three concerns. In the first 
place, there is more to tertiary education than is found in books, computer displays 
and DVDs. The hidden curriculum of social networks, relationships and milieu 
novelty cannot be captured in technology. Distance learning programmes, such as 
those offered by the Open University, learnt this in their infancy and ensured student 
contacts and networks were in place. However, unlike traditional universities, the 
Open University was designed at the outset to support distance learning. In traditional 
universities, distance learning has been added as an afterthought, largely relying on 
the untested assumption that the internet was an ideal vehicle for effecting learning. 
Secondly, there is an increased likelihood that curricula will be tailored to meet 
corporate needs. This tailoring could become so specific as to deny the universality of 
teaching, which for centuries has formed a core university canon (at least in secular 
settings). There is a fundamental distinction between delivering courses to meet a 
company’s needs for its workforce, and delivering a company’s specific needs in 
courses for general access. Whether on campus or off campus, introducing students to 
competing materials is not always achievable—possibly less achievable in technology 
courses than others. However, in a sponsored learning setting the choices may be even 
more restricted. This raises a third concern about the fitting of material to the delivery 
medium. The difficulty with all media technology is that humans have to use it. 
Invariably, the human user must mould his or her material to fit the restrictions of the 
delivery technology. Not all users will mould their material to the same standard, or 
even use the same features. Some level of uniformity in format and delivery is 
desirable from the perspective of teacher and student, but at what point does 
uniformity in format shade into conformity in content?
Some proponents of the knowledge economy admit that there is more to distance 
learning than mere delivery of information.4 While emphasising the importance of 
‘people’ and the ‘collective memory’ of organisations, they argue that the ‘devolved 
university’ (the transformed university) is fast becoming a reality with new 
technologies pulling apart the ‘seams’ of the traditional university. They speculate 
that the new university system will move towards maximum course flexibility and a 
geographical dispersion underpinned by technology. Students could mix stay-at-home 
courses with on-campus courses. Faculty staff would organise their own resources. 
They go so far as to suggest that staff might be paid a fee by the students they 
attract—instead of a salary. Admittedly some of this is speculation, but certain themes 
resonate strongly with the change ideology. In this model, the fortunes of an 
institution are shackled to market forces.
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A recurrent theme in the change ideologies is that salvation can be found by 
embracing technology. This faith in technology to cure the sick and economically 
debilitated is another outgrowth from the hegemony of scientism—the idea that the 
only mode of knowing worth its salt is that practised by science. The deference shown 
to technology, especially in distance learning, is at least on a par with that shown to 
science in the past half-century. Perhaps more so, as science was at least seen as 
having an authority derived from elite learning, whereas technology’s authority is 
diffused between elite and technologically literate users, with the added endorsement 
of entertainment artefacts by popular culture. Within the court of ‘techno-scientism’, 
relativistic theories of knowledge, with their implicit appeal for tolerance and plural 
interpretations, are distinctly at odds with a new imperialising empiricism. The only 
datum is what is measurable, and, preferably, digital, i.e. observable and quantifiable 
with the aid of technology. There is no room here for rationalist doubts over 
unwarranted extrapolation from purely quantitative assessment methods. The 
redemptive power o f technology with its corporate theology in tow has become the 
new dogma of the entrepreneurial university.
The complex nature of the social reality within higher education pre-existing the 
impetus for change is rarely mentioned, let alone analysed in official policy reviews.46 
Such is the charismatic ‘puli’ of the technocratisation of the universities that the 
inversion o f humans into raw materials to serve a science-technology juggernaut 
passes unremarked. To oil the wheels of its motion, a useful myth in the ideology of 
change is that technologies are impartial artefacts—they do not generate incongruous 
influences on human behaviours. However, even something as ubiquitous as the 
computer interface has a range of embedded cultural, political and social biases. 
Technology is far from value-free, and change initiatives lauding its greater 
deployment are promoting values that are rarely dredged to the surface for critical 
evaluation.
One o f the striking paradoxes o f the change ideology is its promotion o f the 
dissemination of even more information electronically, without encouraging an 
increased scepticism about the value o f  such exercises, since information per se is not 
knowledge. Pedagogy rooted in traditional media is, by implication, stagnant, and 
cannot propitiate the change ideology. The jargon of the change ideology requires an 
accommodating pedagogy exercising the products of media technology. Support for 
this position assumes that technology-supported teaching is de facto  qualitatively 
better teaching. In practice, qualitatively better teaching may be subverted by 
overdependence on media technologies. The emphasis on producing materials for 
transmission in teaching may reduce a lecture to little more than a textual experience. 
The teacher-class intersubjectivity that is intrinsic to the traditional imparting of 
scholarship, method and principle is diluted, if  not abandoned. There are cultural, 
personal and social dimensions which have always formed part of the core experience 
o f higher learning. To reduce this exposure to technology encounters is akin to 
reducing cookery to recipe comprehension.
University Restructuring; The New Alchemy?
There are many untested assumptions in the ideology of change, not least of which is 
the major premise that change itself will produce the desired transformation. Similar 
to the proponents of radical transformation, the central quest of the alchemists was to 
produce a transformation (‘transmutation’) by bringing opposites together. In their
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paradigm transformation involved reconciling substances of different status to 
generate a third entity. Through fusing substances that were sympathetic to opposing 
forces, the alchemical magus hoped to produce a unique transformation. Usually this 
was an attempt to produce gold, a pure element, from baser elements. The latter were 
inferior in purpose and value. The experimental quest for the Philosopher’s Stone can 
be broadly understood as the search for a universal catalyst that would ‘guarantee’ the 
results of any transformation.47 Once the process of transformation had been mastered 
with gold as its outcome, the next challenge for the alchemist was the multiplication 
of the result. Given one kilogram of gold, how does one produce two, three or more 
kilograms? The key to giving alchemists their due respect (within their historical 
context) is their belief that transformation was a process of perfection. Transforming 
baser elements into nobler ones was a demonstration of the potential for perfection 
inherent in the environment. Centuries of failure in gold production taught them one 
valuable lesson: transformation in appearance is not equivalent to transformation in 
essence. It remains to be seen whether similar lessons will be learnt during any radical 
transformation in higher education.
This combination of faith and persistence in alchemical experimentation is strikingly 
familiar in a world where universities themselves talk about the value of hybrid 
research and teaching models, entrepreneurial institutions and the need for replication 
of successes. The goal in alchemy was to strip metals of their properties down to 
prime matter, and then to produce gold from the resulting undifferentiated mass. 
Radical transformation adopts many similar assumptions. The universities must have 
their traditional roles and structures pared down, reducing them to primarily techno- 
scientific structures. Once reduced to ‘scaffolding’, they are then better conditioned to 
accept industrial-corporatism, product relevance and market-place alignment. 
Transformation will make perfect the university mission (make it a ‘stand up’ 
university in Clark’s words). It will inject vitality into it and secure it a future, just 
like the alchemical panacea. The transformed university will be a different kind of 
place than the traditional element which has been worked over. The old ‘base’ 
properties will have been ‘exchanged’ for new corporate gold. In the process, the 
university will have become ‘innovative’, ‘devolved’ and ‘entrepreneurial’.
Extraordinary deference to technology is a linchpin in the change ideology’s 
arguments that transformation will succeed. Modem information and communication 
technology (ICT) has become the new Philosopher’s Stone not just in administration 
and teaching, but in all research areas. It is next to impossible to conceive of any 
scientific research that does not require the use of computer technology. The closing 
of the gap between science and its ‘technologisation’ is a key influence on the 
deference shown to techno-scientism. Proper application of ICT will transform the 
universities into market-driven centres of innovation. This is not to imply that all 
those in agreement with radical transformation believe that lead can be turned into 
gold, that admixtures of air, earth, fire and water can account for all transforming 
processes, or that a smattering of numerology and the Kabbalah fortifies scientific 
inquiry, but radical transformation theory encourages polar thinking by promoting 
‘product relevance’ in the ‘market-place’ without necessarily understanding the 
preconditions for successful reconciliation of opposites or even appearing interested 
in such a process.
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Laying the charge of alchemy against the change ideology is polemical but some 
lessons result nevertheless. The problem in effecting change in a university setting is 
that the primary elements (the base elements arguably) are highly educated. While 
this latter quality may qualify them to critique change, in terms of identifying
conditions that ‘change’ must meet, it is not coextensive with initiating a model of
change or seeing it through to completion. The vast lexicon of aspirational vagueness 
drawn upon in radical transformation analyses cannot inspire confidence in 
communities accustomed to reasoned analysis and rigour. Thus, it is precisely the 
more abstract formal disciplines in mathematics, philosophy, linguistics, sociology 
and even some areas of economics (and this list is not exhaustive) that may feel less 
reassured about the validity of the change procedures than disciplines with a more 
experimental and mechanical outlook. Within higher education, several institutions 
are both enormously rich and celebrate lively learning and research environments. It 
is less well established, if established at all, that transformation policies, rather than 
evolution and happenstance, have played a major role in their success. Arguably, like 
the old alchemists, the purveyors of modernisation confuse consistency with 
consequence. The success of the few may be entirely consistent with putative 
modernisation policies, but that does not prove that their success is a consequence of 
such policies. This is at least one fallacy running through the modernisation
programme for higher education. There is always room for luck.
A final point for consideration is the alchemists’ seduction by the technology of their 
day. This was no bad thing, since it is unlikely that modem chemistry could have 
developed without alchemical inventiveness. Much of what the alchemists attempted 
to develop came to nought, however. Were their efforts worthwhile? There is always 
the possibility that the creativity of today may fail in the short term but succeed in the 
long term. No one suspected that the non-Euclidean geometries of the nineteenth 
century were more than curiosities until Einstein developed Relativity. What type of 
knowledge is required to make a judgment in the entrepreneurial university that is not 
unreasonably short-sighted? This is an important question where the industrial Tag’ 
between research, prototype and product is becoming shorter. As time moves on, the 
judgment may be unreasonably influenced by the demands of a technocratic ideology. 
For as long as the research effort does not jar with or challenge a dominant or 
favourably emerging technology, the work can be supported in the short term. The net 
effect o f binding the institutionalisation o f research to a socio-economic agenda is 
arguably a covert means for shifting scarce resources into the hands of vested 
corporate interests.
Technology and the Problem of Knowledge
Among the motives for pursuing transformation, none has been more persuasive than 
technological hubris. Prior to the development of consumer ICT, the authority of 
knowledge rested very much in Big Science. It had brought everything from heart 
transplants to moon landings into the lives of citizens, and in the process settled 
dozens of historical questions in everything from astronomy to zoology. People were 
deferential to Science. In the past two decades, the spread of technology, and the 
embedding of computers in everything from alarm clocks to washing machines has 
created a ‘new deferentialism’, to borrow a phrase.48 Within the theorising about 
university transformation, ICT is identified as contributing to the substantive teaching 
and research missions o f the sector. Its potential as an educational technology is
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considered significant to the likely success of any transformation—e-leaming or 
learning through electronic aids.
The use of technology in education, from wax tablets to the modem computer, is as 
old as education itself. What distinguishes e-leaming technology from other 
developments is its promotion as a revolutionary learning technology uniquely suited 
to modem mass access higher education. It would be surprising, given these claims, if 
universities ignored e-leaming. There are many differences between traditional 
distance learning and e-leaming. Many of these were blurred in early e-leaming 
initiatives. Distance learning is a combination of correspondence courses, audio­
visual materials and campus outreach initiatives. On the other hand, e-learning was 
largely intended as ‘computer desk learning’, with little requirement for campus 
outreach. It was assumed that a reduction in outreach could be compensated for by 
use of electronic mail, bulletin boards and websites. Several high-profile and well 
resourced colleges developed e-leaming programmes. Many of these initiatives have 
failed completely and been wound up, or else have been much reduced in ambition, 
content, format and scale. Those that have survived have either adapted the traditional 
distance educational model (such as the University o f Phoenix) or are offering 
focused short-term courses. The Open University, notably, offers a bare handful of its 
courses online.
In the light of the change ideology’s faith in educational technology, a recent review 
of the paradoxes affecting e-leaming deployment in higher education makes 
interesting reading.49 Among the conclusions reached is that those institutions that 
might benefit most (through increased student numbers) from offering online courses 
are least able to do so due to staff and infrastructural resource constraints. 
Paradoxically, the institutions who could most afford to offer such courses are those 
least interested in doing so—they simply have no need to move beyond their 
traditional campus-residency setting. This is just one of eight conflicts identified in 
the review. Additional problems refer to the lack of uniformity in standards and 
terminology, the ill-preparedness of ‘second chance learners’ to use ICT, and the 
increased burden placed on staff attempting to fit course materials into specific 
formats. The ambiguity and misperceptions in the provision of information, learning 
and knowledge are highlighted in several additional reviews.50
Society’s perceptions of the interconnections between knowledge and technology are 
complex and intriguing. The relationship between science and technology influences 
perceptions of knowing. Legitimate modes of knowing employ the instrumentality 
and modes o f discourse associated with techno-scientism. Consequently, products of 
the exercise of reason outside these parameters are epistemologically dubious. The 
only legitimate knowledge is that arising out of techno-scientific endeavours. Citing 
again the new deferentialism, this places the liberal education agenda in an 
unsustainable condition. The supposed neutrality of science, in terms of its methods 
and substance, is itself conditioned by a nexus of funding supports derived from 
cultural, economic and political judgments about the worth of certain research efforts. 
Hence the neutrality is illusory, but in terms of promoting certain curricula within 
higher education it may be ideologically essential. One analysis pulling together 
strands from Weber and the Frankfurt school argues that the net result of the marriage 
of technology with science is the manufacturing of the illusion of an objective 
rationality which is presented as having the force of an autonomous historical
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process.51 Extending this to higher education transformation, one can argue that a 
process of acculturation has evolved within the sector leading academics to perceive 
themselves as subject to a technological rationality that has the force o f political 
dominion over their activities.
The importation of this ‘rationality’ into areas outside science glues a veneer of 
legitimacy to their methodologies, e.g. organisational theory, management theory, 
knowledge management, etc. By passing off processes as grounded in techno- 
scientism’s rationality, vested interests (power elites) can both disguise their political 
interests and simultaneously legitimate their intentions. Legitimate knowledge is 
presented as a logical outcome of this rationality, because o f demonstrable scientific 
and technological achievements. Whatever is not a logical outgrowth is deprived o f 
legitimacy. The question for the universities is whether they are content to attribute 
rational legitimacy to only those areas that remain concordant with techno-scientism, 
or at least not discordant with it. This is quite a fundamental concern. It may be the 
case that the debate is so biased towards technological modes of investigation that 
speculative inquiry will disappear from higher learning over time.
The attitudes that a society cultivates towards science and technology make possible a 
whole series of transformations in behaviour, civil liberties and judgments about the 
value of human activities. The pressure on the universities to produce techno- 
scientific knowledge as a commodity inevitably trickles down into the cultural value 
system of a society, Technology has enabled the rapid transformation of scientific 
results into profit-making streams. Whatever does not in quick time lend itself to 
instrumental utility, by definition, has little value. An understandable response of 
those in research is to commodify more of their work by either stepping up its 
quantity (in terms of publications) or enhancing its cultural legitimacy through 
techno-scientific sponsorship or industrial collaboration. Certain disciplines have an 
easier path through these mazes. However, in this competition, the Humanities must 
first and foremost define themselves as commodities in the transformed institution, if 
they are to survive.
Awareness o f the dangers in, and inherent unreliability of, many scientific endeavours 
and technologies receives no attention in transformation ideology. The existence of 
outright chicanery in science is rarely debated, yet it exists. 2 The ubiquity of 
computers as stand-alone devices and embedded systems means that technological 
problems and computer bugs may have widespread implications. One security expert 
estimated that the demand for computer software patches exceeded 4000 in 2003 
alone.53 Apart from the labour costs in producing and installing the patches, the effect 
on an organisation’s daily business is not insubstantial. Even these difficulties become 
insignificant when one reflects on a study by the US military’s Chiefs o f Staff that 
identified problems with automated target identification systems as the main cause of 
75% of ‘friendly-fire’ casualties.54 In practice, computer technology has been affected 
with considerable unreliability—admittedly malicious security attacks on the systems 
play their role—with many problems due to carelessness.55 The so-called Millennium 
Bug, or Y2K Problem, was hysterically heralded as a likely digital Armageddon. In 
the end, its impact was unnoticeable, though the funds spent by government and 
industry on ‘precautionary’ measures were enough to eliminate third world debt.56 
Companies that responded to its ‘threat’ did so due to financial benefits arising from 
upgrades, or fear of never-ending litigation by clients.57 More extraordinary, given
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official corporate enthusiasm for computer based ‘everything’, has been the 
reluctance of suppliers to accept responsibility for defective systems. Only very 
recently has the balance begun to shift slightly in favour of the purchaser. Even 
where governments have thrown their considerable resources behind national e- 
leaming initiatives, the results can be economically abysmal. A recent House o f 
Commons report on the failure of the UK e-University project, determined that 
approximately £50 million had recruited merely 900 students.*9 A myriad of 
technology and planning problems contributed to the collapse of the project.
The above are not arguments against technology, nor would similar examples herded 
together from medical and pharmaceutical interests serve as arguments against 
science, but they are evidence of the fallibility inherent in many methods of 
experimentation and discovery in science and technology. The rationality of means 
does not warrant acceptance of the rationality of ends. There are moral implications to 
the way science goes about its business and defines its agenda. Does this pose 
difficulties for the universities, post transformation? In fact it could, if transformation 
is largely about getting ‘relevant products’ to the market-place. There is no ethical 
‘row back’ space factored into the transformation process.
Conclusions
The introduction of the concept o f ‘product’ into the universities own self- 
commentary has created a division between the traditional culture and mission of the 
university as a seat of education and learning, and the emerging multifaceted 
university—the multiversity. The language of industrial production precludes the 
reintroduction of historical practices and subjects with minimal ‘product relevance’ to 
the agenda. There is a fundamental incommensurability between the categories of 
experience, knowledge and value that apply to the universities as centres of learning 
and industries which are centres of product production and profit. However, the 
implications of this incommensurability lie largely unexamined. If left unexamined 
they will have a detrimental effect on the future development of higher learning.
Throughout this paper, it has been argued that the transformation currents flowing at 
present are dyed through and through with instrumentalist thinking. That means that 
the criteria for judging the value of inquiry and teaching are instrumental criteria 
which are themselves related to vested interests. The processes entail a major re­
creation of traditional university positions on pedagogy and inquiry. Not that one 
should be too precious about these values. The past twenty years have witnessed a 
steady, if  somewhat erratic, series of attempts to commodify higher education. The 
contradiction touching the universities’ embrace of transformation hinges on 
understanding the importance the sector has historically attached to reasoned inquiry. 
Reasoned inquiry in higher education both as a discipline and an aspirational value is 
intrinsic of the self-identity of the sector. To preserve historical canons and sectoral 
esteem, the universities in general wish to present any major transformation as 
consonant with reason. For this argument to have any plausibility, however, some 
degree of self-deception is required about the role afforded to market interests in 
shaping the image of the transformed enterprise university.
A developed society must sustain centres of higher learning, since the connection 
between techno-scientific outputs of research and the general condition of an 
economy is not arbitrary or remote. If  the mission of higher education is to serve the
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economy, then let the conditions be specified clearly and the implications for the 
production and critique o f knowledge be subjected to reasoned investigation. Society 
is bigger than the economy. Humboldt and Newman’s models of learning still contain 
useful heuristics, but learning has to fit the age the knower lives in and not an 
academic reverie. Current perspectives on the role of the universities cannot be 
contained within conventional thinking. Conventional wisdom has brought about the 
current problems.60 There is a risk that the change ideology could become, or already 
is, part of conventional wisdom if it fails to take on board the value of critical 
thinking. Very simply put, the transformation proposed via the ‘entrepreneurial 
university’ may become the only tool for assessing solutions and attributing value. 
The alchemical reactions between higher education, the constitution of knowledge 
and the experienced political economy are currently understood in terms of utility 
outcomes. It is appropriate to refer to these relations as alchemical given their focus 
on polarities, sympathetic magic (imitate industry and the hex will be lifted) and the 
central reagent role of transformation.
Worryingly, the change ideology’s emphasis is solely placed on transforming 
‘knowledge production’ processes with scant regard for, or understanding of, the 
implications of these processes for the institutions as social organisations. The 
marshalling of techno-scientific rationality as an unavoidable historical process which 
must be run across the universities, like a ruler across the fingers of an errant child, 
contains many contentious assumptions about legitimate modes of learning and 
knowing. Regressively, it contains a strand o f verificationist thinking that had shifted 
out of philosophy but clearly not out of technology-influenced thinking. Techno- 
scientific research is a necessary condition for sustainable higher education, but few 
would assert its total sufficiency in cultivating ‘rounded’ citizens.
These observations and reflections in themselves are not sufficient to reverse the 
juggernaut of transformation. Nor should they. The combination of theory, practice 
and ideological fervour within the transformation camp may turn out to be wrong—in 
the sense that the predicted results may not transpire—but unassailable reasons for not 
pursuing the course are difficult to gather together. They will always be blunted by 
promises of appropriate monitoring of standards. More disconcertingly, in the longer 
run, the impetus may turn out to be irreparably damaging to the very universities it 
was designed to sustain. At least in the case o f  alchemy, when its major thrust proved 
plainly wrongheaded, modem chemistry was already underway.
Higher learning is not conveniently reducible to industrial product development. The 
idea of a university in its broadest and most established sense is of a place where 
higher needs and noble human values are at least acknowledged, if  not definitively 
teased out. Over-emphasis on techno-scientism entails diminished attention to such 
banalities as moral values. These are the eternal banalities which make up the stuff o f 
life and define the everyday quandaries of citizens. Nonetheless the response of 
‘advanced’ industrial nations, predictably, is to push ethical debate into Law 
Faculties. Once there, these debates can be made subservient to the rationality 
required by the economy. This is not a healthy development. Only humans can effect 
and honour obligations to one another—not science or technology. By constantly 
squeezing the space available for reflection and speculation, and by creating ever 
more specialty techno-scientific centres, the universities are sowing the seeds of 
internal disorder through competition and a lack of dialogue between the periphery
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and the centre. There has to be space for good citizens to thrive, reason and debate. 
That space may be supported by techno-scientific processes, but it cannot be validated 
by them. This is the nub of the problem for the universities embracing transformation. 
Product relevance does not exhaust human needs.
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